SECOND DIVISION
|
MA. SALVACION
G. AQUINO,
Petitioner, - versus - COURT
OF APPEALS (Eight Division), Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 149404 Present: PUNO, Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated: September
15, 2006 |
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D E C I S I O
N
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is the August 6, 2001 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 63907 which affirmed an earlier decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) dismissing the petitioner's
complaint for illegal dismissal against the herein private respondents,
St. Paul’s College of Manila and its president and college dean, Sister Natividad De Jesus Ferraren, S.P.C.
In brief, the pertinent facts are:
Petitioner, a professor in the respondent St. Paul’s College of Manila for 22 years, verbally accepted sometime
in February, 1998 a
tutorial and a summer teaching load for
the summer of 1998. Subsequently, the petitioner decided to leave for the
Unfortunately, it was only on
It
was only upon the belated receipt of the said
April 25 letter that Sister Ferraren learned for the first time of the
petitioner's plan to depart for abroad and of her proposal to alter her summer teaching
schedule. Despite her knowledge of the need for a schedule change as early as March of 1998, the petitioner never bothered to mention about it even when she signed her conformity to the summer load schedule fixed by the college and despite an April 15, 1998
memorandum reminding all teachers to comply with their teaching schedules or risk disciplinary action.
Conformably with the existing college’s policy whereby only its president and college dean can
approve changes in the schedules of classes and applications for leave, Sister Ferraren wrote department chairperson Ms. Shirley Agatep
and college registrar Ms. Lilia B. Santos to submit their written explanations regarding the petitioner's allegations that the two had approved the change in her summer teaching schedule. Both denied the imputed approval and even stated in their respective
written explanations that because they are without authority to act on the matter, they merely advised the petitioner to secure the approval of Sister
Ferraren. While admitting to having merely endorsed the petitioner's request for a change of schedule, Ms. Agatep further expressed surprise on how it came about
that it was only on
Thereafter,
in a memorandum dated May 19, 1998 to which was attached the
aforementioned written explanations of Ms. Agatep and Ms.
Santos, the petitioner
was required to show cause within five (5) days from receipt of
said memorandum why she should not be subjected to
disciplinary action, including dismissal, for: (1) taking a leave without the explicit approval of the college dean and
president; (2)
abandonment of employment; (3) fraud and willful
breach of trust; (4) failure to observe contractual obligations
with the school; (5) serious misconduct or willful
disobedience in connection with work; and (6) insubordination, all punishable under the College’s Faculty Manual.
On
Classes
commenced with the petitioner
still nowhere to be found,
compelling the respondent
college to hire the services of a substitute teacher to take over some of her more important subjects while her other classes were left unattended. Meanwhile, the petitioner
continued to remain in the college’s payroll as a full-time professor for
the subjects assigned to her, including those momentarily taken over by the substitute teacher.
On
Upon
handing over her aforesaid
written compliance to Sister Ferraren, the petitioner verbally requested the latter to simply set it
aside and pleaded to Sister Ferraren to
forgo conducting an administrative hearing on her case so as not to apprise the other teachers of the details of the incident, and expressed her desire to merely retire instead. Sister
Ferraren immediately accommodated her desire for early retirement but directed the petitioner to reduce the same in writing to facilitate the release of her unpaid salaries and benefits as an early retiree. The petitioner told Sister Ferraren
that she would bring a written request therefor the following day.
In turn, Sister Ferraren assured her of the expedient release of her salaries and benefits. Hence, after the petitioner left, Sister Ferraren instructed the college’s accounting
department to compute all the salaries and
benefits due the petitioner and distributed her remaining classes to other teachers. The accounting
department accordingly struck the petitioner's name off the payroll of the college starting
As
things turned out later, however, the petitioner failed to submit her promised written request for
early retirement despite
several attempts on the
part of the college to
contact her for the
purpose. Sensing that the petitioner was deliberately avoiding Sister Ferraren and that she may be contemplating of filing a case for illegal dismissal, the respondent college
decided to hold an administrative hearing on the various charges proferred against her in the show-cause memorandum, which charges remained pending before she optionally retired on
A
day before the scheduled hearing, the petitioner
came back and verbally informed Sister Ferraren of her intention to attend the hearing whereat she
would admit her mistake and put on record her decision to simply retire. During the hearing, however, the petitioner, in a
complete turn about of
what she verbally told to Sister Ferraren, did not admit her
mistake nor make of
record her decision for
an early retirement.
Instead, she excused herself from the hearing for allegedly feeling ill and asked for a
resetting thereof in two (2) weeks, after which she left even as the hearing committee informed her that the hearing would nonetheless proceed as to Ms. Agatep and Ms. Santos who
were then ready
to present their sides. Before leaving, however, the petitioner was assured by the committee that she would be informed of the
minutes of the hearing and that she may respond in writing should she be unable
to attend the next hearing. This was noted in the minutes of the July 17
hearing, which minutes were
duly sent to the petitioner on
On
July 29, 1998, or a day before the next hearing, the respondent college
and Sister Ferraren received
a letter from the petitioner's counsel to the effect that his client does not intend
anymore to attend any
hearings. In the same
letter, the counsel demanded for his client’s reinstatement with full backwages and without loss of seniority rights and benefits. The following day, the investigating
committee proceeded with the hearing, and eventually reached the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of the charges stated in the show-cause
memorandum. Even then,
the committee recommended to allow the petitioner's early retirement and the payment of her benefits in acknowledgment of her desire to simply retire.
It was against the foregoing backdrop
of events when, on
October 6, 1998, the petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and
non-payment of salaries against the herein private respondents.
In his decision of
From the NLRC’s reversal decision,
the petitioner went to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 63907. As stated at the threshold hereof, the
appellate court, in its decision dated
Hence, the petitioner's present recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court raising the following issues:
1. Whether
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the NLRC's finding that
the private respondents have granted the petitioner an early retirement;
2. Whether
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the NLRC's finding that
the private respondents have not illegally dismissed the petitioner and hence
not entitled to reinstatement with backwages and without loss of seniority
rights and other benefits appertaining to her position;
3. Whether
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the NLRC's finding that
Sister Ferraren cannot be held personally liable for the petitioner's claims;
and
4. Whether
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in not awarding moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees to the petitioner.
We DENY.
It bears emphasis that the petitioner has come to this Court
via the vehicle of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In their Comment[2] to the petition, the private respondents very much put in issue
the propriety of the
remedy resorted to by
the petitioner. We sustain the private respondents.
One of the requisites for the issuance of a
writ for certiorari is that there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is emphatic on this. It reads:
Section 1. Petition
for certiorari. - When any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require. [Emphasis supplied]
xxx xxx xxx
The
special civil action of certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a suit fails to appeal a judgment to the proper forum
despite the availability of the remedy of appeal.[3] Certiorari is not and
cannot be used as a substitute for appeal, where the latter remedy is
available.[4] If any, the petitioner's proper recourse would have been to elevate the assailed CA decision to this Court via a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, let alone the fact that the petitioner erroneously resorted to
Rule 65 when appeal by way
of a petition for review under Rule
45 was available,
the error is worse compounded by the circumstance that the petitioner did not file any motion for reconsideration with the CA prior
to the filing of the present petition. The general rule is that a previous
motion for reconsideration in the court of original proceeding is necessary
before invoking the certiorari jurisdiction of a higher court. A petition for certiorari will not generally be entertained unless the public
respondent has had, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct or rectify the error imputed to him.[5]
But even if we
were to overlook the error in the mode of appeal and suspend the application of
procedural rules,
as urged by the petitioner, still the petition must fail.
As
it is, the questions raised in this recourse, be it under Rule 45 or Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, are basically one of facts.
Hornbook is the rule that in a petition for review, only errors of law may be raised.[6] Section 1 of Rule 45 expressly says so, to wit:
Section 1. Filing of petition
with the Supreme Court. - A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth. [Emphasis
supplied]
On the other hand, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, only jurisdictional issues may be
raised, as when a court
or tribunal has acted “without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.” The extraordinary writ
of certiorari cannot legally be used for any other
purpose. In a special civil action for certiorari, the Court cannot correct errors of fact which the lower court
or tribunal may have committed.
Deference
to the expertise acquired by the NLRC and the limited scope granted in the
exercise of certiorari jurisdiction restrain any probe into the correctness of
the NLRC's evaluation of evidence.[7] Factual findings of agencies
exercising quasi-judicial functions, like the NLRC, are accorded not only
respect but even finality, aside from the consideration that this Court is essentially
not a trier of facts.[8]
Hence,
in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65, judicial review does not go as far as to evaluate the
sufficiency of evidence upon which the NLRC based its determinations, the
inquiry being limited essentially to whether said tribunal has acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. And an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as
in grave abuse of discretion when it is performed in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[9]
Here, there is no indication whatsoever that any grave abuse of discretion attended the proceedings below. For sure, the findings of fact were well
substantiated by the evidence presented. We see no
reason to disturb such
findings. Further, those
findings fully support the decision reached by the NLRC as affirmed by the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the CA
is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO
C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
A
T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria with Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello and Perlita J. Tria Tirona, (all ret.), concurring; Rollo pp. 87-99.
[2]
[3] De
La Paz v. Panis, G.R. No.
57023,
[4] Del
Rosario v. Balagot, G.R.
No. L-55377,
[5] Amante v. Sison and Manzanero, 60 Phil. 949, 951 (1934).
[6] Villarico v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 132115,
[7] Travelaire
& Tours Corp. et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission et. al., G.R. No.
131523,
[8]
[9] Intestate
Estate of Carmen de Luna v. IAC, G.R. No. 72424,